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Visiting the main employment office in Warsaw in late 1989, I asked how many people they
were currently paying benefits to.  The answer (in a city of 1.6 million people) was five.  A year
later, unemployment in Poland was more than a million, and by December 1993 was three
million.  There is no need to belabour the resulting strains on a social safety net designed for
a very different régime.
This paper discusses how the safety nets in the reforming countries, though in many
ways well-adapted to the old system, were poorly suited to the needs of a market economy, and
what progress has been made in adjusting them.  The problems faced by the system of income
transfers need to be seen against the backdrop of broader constraints facing policy makers at the
start of the reforms.  The emphasis on these constraints is not intended to sound gloomy; rather
the opposite – it shows how much progress has been made in very difficult circumstances.  A
former French Prime Minister invited fellow citizens to imagine that France had over a very few
years to go through the Political Revolution of 1789, the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth
century and the decolonisation of the 1960’s.  That, he pointed out, was precisely what the
world community is asking Russia to achieve.
1  Background Constraints
Though the distinction is often not watertight, it is useful to discuss separately economic
constraints, political constraints and institutional constraints.
1.1  Economic Constraints
Macroeconomic constraints.  The major problems are well-known.  Initial conditions were
unfavourable, first, in that, prior to the reforms, growth slowed down at levels of per-capita
income far below those in the West.  In addition, many countries had accumulated large foreign
debts.
From this low starting point was superimposed in most countries an output collapse.  The
timing of this output decline varied and so did its extent.  There is controversy about why output
fell as sharply as it did (see Fischer and Gelb 1991;  Gomulka  1991; Balcerowicz and Gelb
1994;  Sachs 1994).  Because of major measurement problems, not least over the extent of
informal-sector activity, there is also controversy about the extent of the decline.  Whichever2 L:\NB\RES\CEE\ALL\96MOCT\MOCT3.PAP
view one takes, however, there is no doubt that output fell; and in many countries it fell by at
least as much as the ouput declines of the Great Depression of the 1930s.
A third macroeconomic constraint, the fiscal crisis (taken here to mean a substantial
budget deficit), is to a significant extent a consequence of the output decline.  An obvious result
is downward pressure on the resources available for income transfers and other social spending
such as health care and education.  The fiscal crisis may not be a completely unavoidable
concommitant of transition in central and eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union
(FSU), as the broad budgetary balance of the Czech Republic in 1992 suggests, but it is difficult
to avoid (for detailed discussion, see Miszei 1994).
The crisis arose because tax revenues fell faster than output, while expenditure fell more
slowly.  So far as revenues are concerned two features should be distinguished.  First, when
output falls, the tax base falls and tax revenues fall.  If the tax structure is progressive, the tax
base shrinks faster than output.
3  Second, and specific to the transition economies, the amount
of tax which can be collected from each million forints (koruni, rubles) of wage payments
declines:  output falls most precipitously in the state sector, so that an increasing number of state
enterprises start to delay/default on their tax and social insurance payments;  and growth tends
to be in the private sector, where tax enforcement is far from fully developed.
Expenditure cannot easily fall as fast as revenues.  Rising unemployment and emerging
poverty increase the demands on the system of transfers.  In addition, some countries face the
demands of servicing their international debt out of declining GDP;  and the problem of debt
service is worse if a country’s exchange rate declines.  Expenditure may also rise for political
reasons:  enterprise subsidies fell slowly in some countries;  and in some countries, Poland for
example, there was a major increase in social expenditure, particularly on pensions.  Though
there was significant variation between countries, throughout CEE and the FSU demands on the
budget increased at precisely the time that revenues were falling, with obvious implications,
which emerge repeatedly below, for income transfers and the social spending more generally.
The resulting problem is twofold:  devising a package to contain the government deficit;  and
how to obtain parliamentary and public support for the necessary measures.  Sustainability of
the reforms thus involves a balancing act of considerable delicacy between budgetary necessity
and political imperative.
Microeconomic constraints.  These arise, first, through an inherited misallocation of labour and
capital.  Much of the capital stock is outdated and in poor condition.  Labour, to a signficant
extent, was paid the wrong wages, had the wrong skills and lived in the wrong place, where3 L:\NB\RES\CEE\ALL\96MOCT\MOCT3.PAP
‘wrong’ in each case means ‘different from what would have occurred over the long term if
market prices had been allowed to prevail’.  Though wages can adjust fairly fast (and have done
so in many countries), changing skills takes time; and geographic mobility is seriously impeded
by the absence of a well-articulated housing market.  A related aspect of misallocation is the
major role of enterprises in large parts of the education, health and social welfare systems.
A second set of constraints is an inappropriate inherited incentive structure.  The issue
is wider than that of wage differentials.  The old system, for example, created active
disincentives to individual initiative.  This will take time to change.
A final set of economic constraints – market imperfections – are not peculiar to the
transition economies but apply in all market systems.  A major lacuna at the start of the reforms
were gaps in the structure of laws establishing key institutions such as the ownership and
transfer of private property;  the conduct of private enterprises;  the operation of a western-style
banking system;  the operation of financial institutions;  employment conditions in the private
sector;  and the development of a system of unemployment benefit appropriate to a period of
high unemployment.  A second and separate gap was the lack of the regulatory structure to
prevent market failure.  Examples in the West include hygiene laws connected with the
production and sale of food, and similar laws relating to the testing and sale of drugs;  laws
relating to the abuse of monopoly power;  laws concerning the conduct of financial institutions
such as private pension funds;  and regulation of total medical spending.
1.2 Political Constraints
Of many political constraints, three require particular discussion: the lack of an inheritance of
rule of law; constitutional arrangements; and a shortage of expertise in the conduct of
democratic politics.
Erosion of the rule of law.  Under the old system, the distrust of government, together with the
fact that legal provisions could, in effect, be overridden for political reasons, produced a lack
of rule of law in the western sense that laws (by and large) are respected, enforced and obeyed.
The result was a disrespect for law so pronounced that, according to the then Bulgarian Prime
Minister early in his country’s reform process, it undermined the moral values of a civil society.
‘By imposing a great number of impractical and often illogical restrictions and
limitations that were inevitably and routinely breached or disregarded, [the communist
authorities] also cultivated in the individual a feeling of being an offender....  This served
to blur the line between the permitted and the forbidden....  Honest and moral people4 L:\NB\RES\CEE\ALL\96MOCT\MOCT3.PAP
would think nothing of stealing from the state or cheating the authorities’ (Dimitrov
1992).
The resulting constraint is that market systems rely heavily on the rule of law because
decision-making is decentralised and economic relations founded on the principle of voluntary
exchange.  Individuals undertaking exchanges need to know that promises have a contractual
basis, which provides some guarantee through the courts that the exchange will take place on
the terms originally agreed to.  A clear definition and enforcement of rights and obligations is
a precondition for a well-ordered market system, particularly one intended to attract foreign
investment.
Constitutional arrangements.  Since constitutions in the West have taken hundreds of years to
evolve it is not surprising that constitutional arrangements in the transition economies have at
times created problems.  This is true even in countries with pre-1939 democratic experience.
The respective powers and responsibilities of the legislature and executive may not be
clear and explicit;  or where they are clear they may work badly.  In the early days of the
reforms in Russia, it was possible for Presidential decrees and legislative Acts to be in direct
conflict, with no constitutional rules for establishing which took precedence.
The electoral régime may yield indecisive results.  The first democratic election in
Poland was conducted under a system of proportional representation with no threshold, leading
to a legislature with a fragmented party structure, hindering the formation of a stable coalition.
4
The powers of the executive might be clear, but the executive might not be able to
enforce them.  In Russia, for example, the central authorities have experienced difficulties in
persuading localities to remit tax revenues to the centre.
An additional problem is the potential for legislative overload.  In part the problem is
unavoidable, given the scale of necessary reform.  A second source of overload is the inclusion
of considerable detail in primary legislation.  The level of benefits such as pensions was
frequently included in primary legislation, so that changes (e.g. because of inflation) required
extensive Parliamentary debate.  A common result is a legislative bottleneck, leading to delays
and badly-crafted laws.
Lack of experienced democratic politicians.  The constitution sets out the rules of the game.
But the reforms also need professional players of the democratic political game.  The early5 L:\NB\RES\CEE\ALL\96MOCT\MOCT3.PAP
transition was a revolutionary period, and many of the usual rules of politics could not apply.
That period, however, is now over, and ‘normal’ politics is increasingly the rule.  The range of
depth of problems is daunting.  Politicians facing a fiscal crisis have to reduce expenditure, e.g.
by raising the age of retirement or by reducing medical salaries.  The implementation of such
policies is possible only if there is sufficient political support;  and the development of such
support requires an ability to manage the political dimensions of policy, particularly where it
creates a significant number of losers.  These are major problems even for experienced western
politicians, so that the difficulties faced by politicians in CEE and FSU should not be surprising.
The problem is made worse because the time scale for economic reform is medium term, but
all the pressures of democratic politics are short term.  This creates a vulnerability to populism
which is greater the more painful are the policies.
Yet virtually no CEE politicians in the early reform process had any practical experience
of democratic politics.  Many early ministers were former academics who did not intend to stay
in politics.  Few of the early reform politicians had much idea of how western politicians
operate, in particular (a) how they use the printed and broadcast media to seek to inform the
public, to shape the political agenda and to acquire feedback of what the electorate thinks, and
(b) how to use polls, encounter groups and similar devices to guage opinion in different
constituencies.  In the West, such skills are possessed by successful politicians, by leaders of
pressure groups (e.g. Friends of the Earth), and by the best sorts of public relations experts.
In part these are diminishing problems.  Virtually all of the CEE countries have had at
least one election since the start of the transition, and political experience is building up. But
the importance of political constraints, even so, should not be underestimated.
1.3 Institutional Constraints
The physical infrastructure in CEE and FSU is deficient in obvious ways.  Somewhat less
obvious, but at least as important, are major deficiencies in the human capital infrastructure.
Outdated skills.  Inappropriate human capital is pervasive.  The problem is not primarily one
of too little human capital, but of the wrong type.  Outdated skills are a widespread problem.
There was no significant training in modern management under the old system.  Training abroad
was generally restricted to technicians who were to work with foreign equipment.  Teachers and
public officials had little or no contact with anything but the communist world.  With a few
exceptions in medicine, sciences and some technical areas, their knowledge became out of date.6 L:\NB\RES\CEE\ALL\96MOCT\MOCT3.PAP
‘Oldthink’ is pervasive and will not be overcome without effective education and publicity.
The first major problem is that important concepts are missing.  An implication of communist
ideology was the absence of the notion that scarce resources have an opportunity cost.
5  Without
such a concept, no sensible discussion of economic efficiency is possible.  Another conceptual
gap is that under state ownership there was no clear distinction between the property of the state
and that of the enterprise, and hence no clear concept of taxation.
Communication problems result both from lack of training and from missing concepts.  The
lack of a common educational background, aggravated by the lack of western languages, creates
difficulties in communicating with western experts.  Training abroad on short courses and
training of trainers by foreign experts are thus often less effective than had been hoped.  A more
subtle manifestion of the same problem arises because missing concepts lead to missing words.
This creates major translation problems, both for oral interpretation and for translation of
written documents.  The term ‘cash benefits’, for example, initially proved a consistent problem
for interpreters, since there was little understanding of the distinction between wages (mainly
related to individual productivity for reasons of economic efficiency) and income transfers
(mostly paid out of the state budget for distributional reasons).  These, largely unrealised,
communication problems act as a barrier to speedy and effective transfer of information and
know-how.
The resulting institutional capacity constraints are major.  Manifestations include a lack
of knowledge of modern administrative theory and practice, and a lack of technical know-how.
Administrative methods at the start of the reforms had changed little since the end of the Second
World War.  They were generally cumbersome, unnecessarily complicated and slow.  In the
early transition, administrative personnel in most CEE countries generally relied on pencil and
paper;  typewriters were often the highest available technology.  The acute relevance for income
transfers, which require extensive and sophisticated administration, is clear.
2  Inherited Problems and Progress
Income transfers historically made up a much smaller share of GDP in CEE than in the West,
with a much larger role for consumer and producer subsidies and public investment.
6  The
welfare impact of the cancellation of most of the subsidies and the dramatic fall in public
investment is an important part of the context.  Against this backdrop, this section discusses the
major problems specific to the social safety net at the start of the reforms and progress in
addressing them.7 L:\NB\RES\CEE\ALL\96MOCT\MOCT3.PAP
Throughout the rest of the paper, following conventional usage, cash benefits are divided
into three types.
   ! Social insurance is awarded without an income test on the basis of (a) a person’s
contributions record and (b) the occurrence of a specified event, such as becoming
unemployed or reaching a particular age.  The essence of social insurance is that it offers
protection against what, at least in principle, are insurable risks.
   ! ‘Universal’ benefits are awarded on the basis of a specified event, without regard to a
person’s income or contributions record. Examples include family allowance and free
health care.
   ! Social assistance is awarded on the basis of (a) an income test (see the Glossary), and (b)
the occurrence of a specified event, without a contributions test.
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The strategy for reform needs to be rooted in the nature of the systemic change.  Prior to the
reforms, the structure of wages and income transfers were relatively well-adapted to the needs
of the old system. Wages were low and fairly undifferentiated;  and income transfers were
awarded to broad groups of people, such as families with children (through family allowance)
and the elderly (through pensions).  That structure, however, is poorly-adapted to the needs of
a market economy, which requires wages to be differentiated because of the resulting incentives
to efficiency.  But if the variation in wages and incomes across people gets larger, the system
of income transfers can no longer be aimed at groups, but needs to be targeted in a more
sophisticated way which takes account of differences in individual circumstances.
A key part of the strategy for reform, therefore, is improved targeting.  This has two
aspects:
   ! to ensure effective poverty relief, benefits should go to all who need them, i.e. there
should be no significant gaps in coverage (this is known as horizontal efficiency);
   ! to contain costs, benefits should go only (or mainly) to those who need them, i.e. there
should not be excessive ‘leakage’ of benefits (known as vertical efficiency).
These are discussed in turn in sections 2.1 and 2.2.  Most political discussion focuses on the
latter, in that it relates to the cost of benefits;  but the first aspect is equally important, since it
has a direct bearing on the effectiveness of poverty relief.  
Alongside better targeting, it is necessary to ensure that income transfers, to the extent
possible, assist the operation of the labour market.  Improving incentives (section 2.3) is8 L:\NB\RES\CEE\ALL\96MOCT\MOCT3.PAP
therefore essential.  Finally, more sophisticated targeting requires an administrative structure
capable of putting it into effect (section 2.4).
2.1  Targeting 1:  Relieving Poverty
There is a mistaken view that accurate targeting is possible only by awarding benefits
on the basis of an income test, i.e. where the amount of benefit is exactly related to individual
or family income.  It is important to realise that income tests have major costs.  They are
administratively demanding;  they can be intrusive and hence stigmatising;  and they can create
major disincentives to work effort and to saving.  Accurate targeting, moreover, does not always
require an income test.  There are two ways in which the poor can be identified:  through an
income test, or via indicators of poverty, i.e. possession by the individual/family of one or more
easily observable characteristics which are highly correlated with poverty, for example ill-
health, old age, or the presence of children in the family.  Social insurance benefits are based
on factors such as unemployment, ill-health or old age, and thus use indicator targeting.
Similarly, family allowance, being based on family size, is relatively well-targeted,
notwithstanding the absence of an income test.
The difficulties should not be underestimated, however:  defining a poverty line is
problematic;  tight targeting can create a tension between economic and political sustainability
of the reforms;  and indicators of poverty may be imperfect.  For all these reasons, targeting is
a matter of considerable subtlety (see Atkinson, forthcoming).
Problems.  At the start of the reforms, the system of poverty relief faced strategic problems:
missing data, missing benefits, gaps in coverage, non-receipt of entitlement, and, in some cases,
benefits which were too low.
Missing data.  The absence of data on people’s incomes comes on top of the well-known
problems of defining and measuring poverty  (see Atkinson 1987; 1989, Ch. 1; 1991;  Barr
1993a, Ch. 6).  Since communism, officially, had no poverty, there was no need to collect
poverty data (indeed, the system discouraged such enquiry).  This is an area in which real
progress has been made, in that most countries now have a household survey of some sort.
Missing benefits.  Since the old system officially had no unemployment or poverty, its
systems of unemployment benefit and poverty relief were rudimentary or (in the case of
unemployment benefit) sometimes non-existent.  The theory was that everyone had a job whose
wage, together with other transfers, kept them out of poverty;  the only people who did not work
were those with long-term health problems, whose needs were met by disability pension, or the9 L:\NB\RES\CEE\ALL\96MOCT\MOCT3.PAP
elderly, who received a retirement pension.  Thus, at least in principle, there was no reason for
anyone to be poor unless, for example, they had a drinking problem, or emotional problems or
were a ‘social misfit’ of some sort.  There was no need in such a world for unemployment
benefit or a broad-ranging system of poverty relief.
So far as unemployment benefit has been concerned there has been real progress, in the
sense that all the reforming countries now have working systems.  The development of social
assistance has been more sporadic: for fiscal reasons;  because growing informalisation makes
targeting an even more difficult problem than normal;  and because of limited administrative
capacity.  Poverty relief of last resort remains patchy throughout the region, particularly in the
countries of the FSU.
Gaps in coverage.  Under the old system, virtually all cash benefits were part of social
insurance.  As a result of the reforms, there are typically three sets of benefits, unemployment
benefit, social insurance benefits and social assistance, organised by three separate authorities.
8
Gaps arise where the linkages between the three sets of benefits are incomplete, which is a
particular problem for recipients of unemployment benefit.
A second gap is incomplete coverage of workers in the private sector.  The problem is
no longer one of eligibility (workers in the private sector typically face the same régime as
workers in the state sector), but of enforcement.  Throughout the growing informal economy,
employment remains undeclared, resulting in incomplete or missing contribution records and
hence loss of benefit entitlement.  This is a continuing, almost certainly a growing, problem.
A third gap was inadequate coverage of some marginal groups by maternity benefit and
family allowance.  Maternity benefit depends on a contributions record in almost all the
advanced industrialised countries and throughout Latin America.
9  In CEE/FSU, however, large
agricultural populations and the self-employed were excluded or received significantly lower
benefits.  Declining agricultural populations and gradual extension of coverage improved
matters, but gaps remain in some countries, for example Poland and Romania.
Family allowance had even greater gaps.  Whereas social insurance is intended to offer
insurance against risk, an important purpose of family allowance is to help a family redistribute
across the life cycle.  Precisely because having children is not in any sense an insurable risk,
family allowance in most western European countries is universal (i.e. paid without a
contributions record or income test (see Council of Europe 1992;  Commission of the European
Communities 1993).  The richer countries in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay)10 L:\NB\RES\CEE\ALL\96MOCT\MOCT3.PAP
also provide family allowance, usually for those covered by social insurance (Mesa-Lago 1990,
Table 19).  In CEE/FSU, family allowance was normally part of social insurance, and thus
excluded families outside formal employment.  During the 1980s coverage of family allowances
gradually broadened, but the first country to introduce a universal allowance, Hungary, did so
only in 1990.
Progress has been patchy.  There has been some progress in smoothing the linkages
between different benefits for unemployed people.  In contrast, growing informalisation has
tended to reduce coverage in the private sector.  Coverage of family allowance remains far from
universal.
Non-receipt of entitlement.  Not everyone who is entitled to benefit may receive it.  Take-
up can be incomplete either because people do not apply for benefit, or because they apply and
are wrongly refused (see Atkinson 1989, Ch. 1).  Though evidence is scant, it is known that
there have been problems, particularly with social assistance, but sometimes also with pensions,
when funding sources have dried up.
10  Not least because of budgetary exigencies, the problem
is a continuing one.
Inadequate benefit levels.  The adequacy of the minimum benefit could be questionable.
The problem arises because the minimum level of the major benefits is often not tied to a
poverty line but either to the average wage or to the minimum wage.  The problem if the
minimum benefit is tied to the average wage is that it falls if average wages fall;  and real wages
fell significantly throughout CEE/FSU during the early transition.  Indeed, the whole purpose
of the incomes policies which normally accompanied the early transition was to ensure that
wages were not fully protected against inflation.  Alternatively, if the minimum benefit is tied
instead to the minimum wage, the problem is that the minimum wage is highly political at the
best of times, and even more when subsidies on basic commodities are being reduced.  If there
are additional knock-on effects for the minimum level of benefits, it becomes even more
political.
Outcomes:  trends in poverty.  The wealth of literature on this topic (Cornia 1994; Cox, Eser
and Jimenez 1995;  Fajth 1994;  Garner 1995;  Milanovic 1995;  Rutkowski, forthcoming;
Torrey, Smeeding and Bailey 1995) is explained partly by the fact that, though the quantity of
data is no longer a problem, its interpretation is fraught with difficulty.  For well-known
reasons, income is a highly imperfect yardstick of individual welfare even in the West;  and in
the transition economies the problem is even worse.11 L:\NB\RES\CEE\ALL\96MOCT\MOCT3.PAP
   ! Pre-transition figures on income took no account of the non-availability of goods, nor
of the fact that access to goods was easier for some groups than others.  The problem
then is how to interpret changes in people’s incomes.
11
   ! The transition led to sharp changes in relative prices, making it difficult to estimate
inflation and hence difficult to assess what happened to people’s real incomes.
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   ! With increasing informalisation, significant amounts of income, particularly in the
private sector, are not captured in official statistics.  There is growing evidence (Cox,
Eser and Jimenez 1995;   Garner 1995;  Torrey, Smeeding and Bailey 1995) that
households adopt a range of informal coping strategies, including intra-household
transfers, own production, and employment in the informal sector, which parallel formal
sector activities.  It has been suggested that official statistics may understate GDP by as
much as 20 per cent, and in some countries even more (for general discussion, see
Dallago 1995).
Despite these measurement problems, a number of stylised facts emerge.
   ! In almost all the reforming countries there has been an increase in poverty, often a sharp
increase (Milanovic 1995, Table 2; Cornia 1994, Table 10) and in inequality (Milanovic
1995, Table 2; Torrey, Smeeding and Bailey 1995, Table 4).  As examples, the poverty
headcount rose from low levels under the old system to an estimated 20 per cent in
Poland in 1993-94, 17 per cent in Bulgaria, 32 per cent in Romania, an average of 36 per
cent in the Baltics, and to 43 per cent in Russia (Milanovic, 1995, Table 2).
   ! The losers are disproportionately the unemployed and children (Fajth 1994).
   ! Pensioners, by and large, have held their ground (Milanovic 1995).
   ! The ‘winners’ are people who are better-educated and/or those with jobs in the private
sector (Milanovic 1995; Rutkowski forthcoming).
2.2  Targeting 2:  Containing Costs
Problems.  Targeting can fail because benefits may be higher than is compatible with fiscal
realities, because access to benefits (e.g. invalidity pension) may be too easy, or because work
can be combined on generous terms with receipt of benefits.12 L:\NB\RES\CEE\ALL\96MOCT\MOCT3.PAP
High  benefits arise, first, because many benefits are fully earnings-related.  It is not self-
evident that this should be so.  Flat-rate unemployment benefits are becoming more common
(e.g. in Bulgaria and Poland), and Estonia and Latvia have both flat-rate unemployment benefit
and flat-rate pensions.  Another possibility is to have a basic, flat-rate pension plus a second-tier
earnings-related pension which rises less than proportionately with earnings.  Furthermore, most
benefits are uprated in line with changes in earnings.  When real earnings fall, this reduces
costs;  however, it also reduces the minimum benefit, and thus reduces the effectiveness of
poverty relief.  On the other hand, when real earnings rise, the use of an earnings index adds to
the cost of benefits.  Thus, tying benefits to earnings hinders poverty relief if real earnings fall,
and makes cost containment less effective if real earnings rise.
High family benefits.  Family benefits in CEE in the mid 1980s cost over twice as much
as the OECD average of 1.2 per cent of GDP (Sipos 1994, Table 10.1). Early in the transition,
the family allowance for each child was eight per cent of the average monthly wage in Poland,
and 11 per cent per child for a two-child family in Czechoslovakia.  Across the OECD, the
average level of support from all family benefits was 7½ per cent of average earnings per family.
In addition in some countries, benefit was also paid for a dependent spouse.  As a result, family
allowance played part of the role which in industrialised countries is played by wages.  The
pattern in western Europe is to pay such benefits at a lower rate, complemented by income-
tested family support (see Commission of the European Communities 1993). 
Maternity benefits were generally at or close to 100 per cent of the mother’s previous
wage. Again, this is high compared with western countries (usually 50 - 85 per cent of the
mother’s wage), but similar to many Latin American countries (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, the old
Chilean system, Costa Rica, Mexico and Uruguay – see Mesa-Lago 1991).
The high level of family benefits is understandable historically, when the distribution of
earnings was flat, with differences in family size accommodated by generous family benefits,
but is increasingly inappropriate as the economic reforms take effect and wages become the
main source of family support.
Ease of access to some benefits is a further problem so far as containing costs is
concerned.  Early legislation tended to define unemployment broadly.  The 1989 Polish law, for
instance, awarded benefit to anyone without a job, even if they had no recent labour-market
attachment.  Access to pensions is also easy.  Normal pensionable age in CEE (60 for men, 55
for women)
13 is low by western standards;  and some groups (e.g. miners, teachers, ballerinas)
are eligible for pension even earlier.  These groups can be numerous.  As discussed shortly, they13 L:\NB\RES\CEE\ALL\96MOCT\MOCT3.PAP
can generally combine pensions with continuing work, often continuing in their old job.  In
addition, years of work while receiving pension count as years of service, and add to pension
entitlement.  These arrangements, again, are understandable in their historical context, given
pervasive labour shortages.  Their cost is high.  In Poland in 1990, one third of expenditure on
old age pensions was on individuals below the normal pensionable age (World Bank 1993, Ch.
4).
Invalidity pension raises parallel problems.  Recipients are numerous for two separate
reasons.  First, little emphasis was put on safety at work, so that many individuals have genuine
and serious health problems.  This problem requires separate remedial action.  Second, access
to benefit is relatively easy, not least because the authorities typically have limited power to
control access.  Western European experience suggests that rising unemployment puts
increasing pressure on invalidity pensions.
Cost containment can be ineffective also because of the ease with which receipt of
benefit can be combined with work.  Old age pensioners can generally work full time, or nearly
full time, with no loss of benefit.  Similarly, people can qualify for invalidity pension even if
they have suffered no loss of earning capacity.  An individual who loses a limb, but whose long-
run health and working capacity is unaffected, will generally receive a continuing partial
invalidity pension whilst performing his or her old job and receiving a full wage.
Progress to date.  Family allowance and maternity benefit are paid at a lower real rate than in
1990 throughout the region.  In the Czech Republic, family allowance is 80 per cent of its 1990
value, the smallest decline of any of the reforming countries; in many countries the benefit is
half or less of its real 1990 value.  Whether this is progress (benefits accord better with the fiscal
situation and hence allow room for growing private investment) or not (benefits are too low to
relieve poverty) is a matter for continuing debate.
On the pensions front there has been much debate but little has changed.  The age at
which pension is first paid has, if anything declined.  By far the worst example is Poland.  As
Table 1 shows, half of all workers within five years of pensionable age receive a pension.
Access to disability pension is also easier (though by a narrower margin) in Poland than in the
other countries in the table, so that it is not suprising that social spending in Poland was about
one fifth of GDP in 1994.
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There is limited good news.  Some countries are close to bringing in legislation to raise
the retirement age, though the actual age of retirement has thus far continued to fall in all
countries except the Baltics.  The terms on which a person can receive a pension while
continuing to work have been made less generous:  the Baltics, Hungary, Poland and Russia
have introduced a retirement test or have restricted access to pensions in other ways (for
example paying a pension to someone who continues to work, but only if he/she is working in
the private sector).  In addition, many countries have partially or totally withdrawn pensions for
special groups.
2.3  Improving Incentives
Problems arise both with respect to the structure of benefits and through the way social
insurance contributions are organised.
Incentive effects of benefits.  In many of the CEE countries, unemployment benefit was
up to 75 per cent of the worker’s previous wage (in Ukraine and Belarus early in the transition
it was 100 per cent for the first three months of unemployment).  Similarly, sick pay was often
100 per cent of the worker’s wage.  The resulting tendency to extended sick leave was
aggravated by weak monitoring.  The prevailing view in the large western literature on the
incentive effects of the replacement ratio (i.e. the ratio of benefits to previous earnings) is that
it should should not be given undue emphasis as an influence on the level or duration of
unemployment.
14  Other factors, for instance the fact that unemployment benefit is cut off after
(say) 12 months, are regarded as more important.  That research, however, is based on the range
of replacement rates typical in western Europe and the USA, and therefore cannot be applied
uncritically to CEE/FSU.  Other adverse incentives arise in CEE/FSU where the definition of
unemployment is broad, where there is no limit to the duration of entitlement and/or where the
‘actively-seeking-work’ condition receives little attention.
The contributions regime also creates adverse incentives.  The social insurance
contribution is generally paid entirely by the employer, the absence of a worker contribution
having been regarded as one of the victories of socialism.  The problem if the entire contribution
is paid by the employer (and even worse when employers faced a soft budget constraint) is that
everyone thinks that benefits are paid by someone else.  This is the classic third-party payment
problem, in which there is no incentive for anyone to restrain benefits (see Barr 1994a, Ch. 2).
There is an exact parallel with fee-for-service medical care financed by insurance.
A second problem with contributions is that they are large – typically 40-45 per cent of
the gross wage, though they could be considerably higher (81 per cent in Ukraine in April15 L:\NB\RES\CEE\ALL\96MOCT\MOCT3.PAP
1992).  Such high contributions interfere with the competitiveness of enterprises and depress
the demand for labour and in particular, given the high cost of benefits for mothers with young
children, the demand for female labour.  They also create incentives for labour to migrate to the
informal sector and/or for underdeclaration of workers’ incomes.
A further problem is that contributions are fragmented.  Throughout CEE there was
considerable earmarking through multiple contributions (some payslips could have more than
twenty separate contributions for different benefits).  Such contributions used to be transferred
to the general budget which allowed for sizeable redistribution between the insured and the
general population.  Governments routinely used social insurance resources for other purposes.
One ill-effect is fiscal inefficiency (e.g. depending on how contribution rates are specified by
legislation, some benefits may be over-financed and others under-funded);  in addition, separate
collection procedures for each of the funds are administratively costly.
Progress to date.  Replacement rates, particularly for unemployment benefits, have been
reduced in many countries.  The definition of unemployment has been narrowed;  all countries
now have a maximum duration, usually not more than 12 months, for which unemployment
benefit is paid.  The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have flat-rate unemployment
benefits, with advantages in terms of incentive effects, cost and ease of administration.  The
‘actively-seeking-work’ condition, in contrast, is rarely well policed.  On the contributions front
there is little good news.  Employers still pay the entire (or almost the entire) contribution;
contribution rates are high, driving people into the informal sector, eroding the contributions
base and thus further adversely affecting the finance of benefits.
2.4  Strengthening Administration
Problems.  As discussed earlier, a widening income distribution necessitates more sophisticated
targeting of benefits, which in turn requires greater administrative capacity.  Yet benefit
administration at the start of the reforms was lamentably underpowered in all the countries.
Excessively complex benefit structures.  Benefits in the past were mostly long-term (family
allowance, pensions).  Individuals receiving short-term benefit from the public authorities were
few and could therefore receive ‘Rolls Royce’ treatment.  In addition, little emphasis was put
on administrative efficiency.  For both reasons benefit structures tended to be highly complex,
an unsustainable situation with large-scale unemployment.
The role of enterprises in benefit administration.  Enterprises provided information to
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family allowance and short-term benefits as part of an individual’s pay packet.  The first
problem with this arrangement is that benefit administration by enterprises becomes
increasingly unsustainable as job mobility increases, as enterprises increasingly face hard
budget constraints, and as large numbers of people work for small-scale employers or become
self-employed.  These changes necessitate a major transfer of administration from the enterprise
to the public benefit authorities.  A second problem is the extent to which the social insurance
authorities are ignorant of individual records.  All but the smallest enterprises pay social
insurance contributions en bloc for their employees.  The social insurance authorities have no
knowledge whatever about individual contribution records.  Individuals approaching retirement,
with the aid of their employer, must put together a dossier of their entire work history to
establish their contribution record.  For the same reason, the social insurance authorities
generally have no knowledge of individual recipients of short-term  benefits and family allowance.
Both problems impose major limitations on the range of reforms which are administratively
feasible in the short run.
Old-fashioned administrative methods.  Administrative capacity was, and remains, limited.
Records are generally of the pencil-and-paper variety.  The main method of getting short-term
benefits to recipients was through the employer.  For benefits such as pensions, the main vehicle
of payment was (and is) cash through the postal system.
Progress to date.  There has been some simplification of benefits, particularly unemployment
benefits, but little progress in moving benefit administration from the enterprise to the social
insurance authorities.  A number of countries (Hungary for example) have embarked on major
projects to upgrade administrative capacity, including the development and installation of a
computer system capable of maintaining individual social insurance records.  Progress in a
number of areas (e.g. whether pensions are paid electronically to the pensioner’s bank account)
must await progress in  financial institutions and telecommunications.
3  Achievements and Limitations
This section summarises very briefly what has been achieved, and what remains to be done.
Microeconomic gains.  Some gains were apparent surprisingly quickly, and contributed directly
to individual welfare.
   ! Shortages disappeared rapidly.  Price liberalisation reduced  excess  demand  and
encouraged additional supply.  Queues largely disappeared and so did black market17 L:\NB\RES\CEE\ALL\96MOCT\MOCT3.PAP
prices.  What is surprising is not the results themselves, but the speed with which the
introduction of market forces produced these gains.
   ! Not only did availability increase;  so did the range and quality of products.  The
combined effect of price liberalisation with recession was to bring about a switch from
a shortage economy to one with low demand, giving consumers more power and sellers
an incentive to provide the goods which consumers wanted.  Easier access to foreign
goods further improved matters.  Wider choice also started to manifest itself in the
labour market, and in health care, education and training.
   ! The introduction of market-determined wages and prices,  together  with  supply
liberalisation, improved work incentives;  and market-determined wages together with
harder budget constraints gave firms incentives to hire only the quantity and type of
skills they needed, and gave individuals stronger incentives to acquire those skills.
Economic reform also liberated latent entrepreneurial talent, particularly in the emerging
private sector.
Macroeconomic gains.  Though the precise magnitude of the output decline can be disputed,
output fell initially, generally sharply, in all the countries of CEE and the FSU.  Growth has now
resumed in almost all the countries of CEE.  Output in 1994 grew at below 2 per cent in
Bulgaria, Croatia and Lithuania, at 2 – 4 per cent in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia and
Romania and at  4 – 6 per cent in Albania, Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia.  Growth was still
negative inter alia in Russia (–15 per cent) and Ukraine and Belarus (output declining by over
20 per cent).
Political gains.  There were also major political benefits.
   ! A free press, including the broadcast media, grew rapidly.  Just  as  opening  the
economies to foreign trade improved the incentives for domestic producers, so did
opening up to foreign news (e.g. access to television satellite dishes, fax machines, and
the like) create incentives for government to be open.
   ! Free, multi-party elections increasingly became the norm.  These, together with a free
press, started to build a political culture, the development of which is a key ingredient
for effective democratic government.18 L:\NB\RES\CEE\ALL\96MOCT\MOCT3.PAP
   ! The protection of individual rights improved.  This was less an outcome of constitutional
guarantees (which, in a formal sense, existed under the old system) than of free elections
and press freedom.
Income transfers:  the good news and the bad.
   ! Despite the increase in unemployment in Poland over the first year of the reforms, from
effectively zero to well over 1 million, the authorities did manage to get system of
unemployment up and running, and actually paying benefits, roughly on time, broadly
to the right people.  The same is true in the other reforming countries.
   ! Despite the weakness, both fiscal and administrative, of formal systems of poverty relief,
there is growing evidence that households have developed a variety of coping
mechanisms, including work in the informal sector, own-production and intra-household
transfers.
   ! That said, and notwithstanding measurement problems, many people suffered a large
decline in their (often already low) standard of living.  Poverty increased, often sharply;
and the problem is compounded by uncertainty and (related, though separate) by stress.
The fact that these factors are hard to measure does not make them any less real.  The
development of social assistance does not yet match up to the task.
   ! Much work is still needed:  to streamline the structure of benefits;  to target benefits in
a much more precise way, for instance by raising the age of retirement;  to strengthen
social assistance;  and to build administrative capacity.  The problems listed in section
2 are a long agenda for reform.  Some progress has been made, but much remains to be
done.19 L:\NB\RES\CEE\ALL\96MOCT\MOCT3.PAP
1. For further detail, see Barr (1994b), Barr, Gomulka and Tomeš (1994) and Sipos (1994), on
which this paper is largely based.  I am grateful to Tanya Proskuryakova for assistance in
picturing progress since 1990.
2. Department of Economics, London School of Economics; currently on leave at the World
Bank as a principal author of the 1996 World Development Report, whose theme is transition.
3. To illustrate the point with a simple example, suppose income tax is paid at 25 per cent on
income above $2000.  Someone with an income of $6000 will therefore pay $1000 in tax.  If,
during a recession, his income falls to $4000, his tax bill is $500.  Thus if income falls by one
third, tax revenues halve.
4. To deal with this problem, Poland introduced a threshold in 1993 of 5 per cent of total votes
for single parties, and 8 per cent for coalitions.  The purpose of the threshold was to reduce the
number of political parties in Parliament.
5. I.e. that the cost of resources used for one purpose are the other uses to which they could have
been put.
6. Kopits (1991) found that in CEE subsidies were up to 22 per cent of GDP, whilst cash
benefits were only 10 per cent.  In the European Union, the comparable figures were 6 and 16
per cent.  See also Kopits (1992).
7. These are the pure cases.  In reality the categories can become blurred:  both social insurance
and ‘universal’ benefits may be partly income tested, e.g. by being included in taxable income.
8. Some countries have avoided this problem.  In Albania and Latvia, unemployment benefit
was incorporated from the start in the social insurance arrangements.
9. 21 of the 22 Latin American countries had some sort of maternity benefits (see Mesa-Lago
1991).
10. During the summer of 1992, with rapid inflation and a consequent shortage of cash,
President Yeltsin, visiting a number of Siberian towns, was reputed to have had a planeload of
cash as part of his entourage, specifically for paying wages and pensions.
11. Suppose that before the transition, a pint of milk, when available, cost 1, and individual X
had an income of 1000.  After the transition, milk is always available, and costs 5, and
individual X still has an income of 1000.  On the face of it, individual X is poorer;  but if he/she
could rarely get milk under the old system, matters are much less clear.
12. There are at least two sets of problems.  With non-market clearing prices (i.e. under the old
system), both Paasche and Laspeyres indices may overestimate inflation, and hence also
overstate the fall in real wages and living standards.  Second, in the face of sharply changing
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relative prices, the pattern of people’s consumption changes, thus sharply changing the weights
which are used to calculate a consumer price index.  The use of a consumer price index to
measure inflation in these circumstances is, to say the least, problematic.
13. Poland is an exception;  pensionable age is 65 (60 for women).
14. For surveys, see Atkinson and Micklewright (1991);  Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991).21 L:\NB\RES\CEE\ALL\96MOCT\MOCT3.PAP
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TABLE 1:  WITHDRAWAL FROM THE LABOUR FORCE ON PENSIONS, 1993
DISABILITY PENSION
% working age population
EARLY RETIREMENT
% of population 5 years prior to
retirement
Total Male Female Total Male Female
Croatia 8.9 9.0 8.7 1.9 2.1 1.7
Hungary 7.2 7.6 6.7 5.8 11.4 1.8
Poland 9.6 13.9 6.7 50.3 62.6 41.3
Slovenia 8.5 10.4 6.6 25.9 30.3 22.2
SOURCE:  World Bank, Social Challenges of Transition Database. [cite Andrews and Rashid]